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Prevent Defense
WILL THE RETURN OF THE MULTIYEAR
SCHOLARSHIP ONLY PREVENT THE NCAA’S
SUCCESS IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION?
INTRODUCTION
In football there is a common defensive formation called
“Prevent Defense,” which teams use at the end of a game or right
before halftime, in hopes of stopping an opposing team from
scoring.1 The formation positions defensive backs and linebackers,
the players responsible for pass coverage, farther away from the
line of scrimmage.2 This strategy makes it exceedingly difficult for
the offense to gain substantial yardage on any single play, but
allows them to easily and consistently move the football down the
field through short gains.3 By forcing a team to run a greater
number of plays, coaches believe that time will expire before the
offense has reached a scoring position.4
Although teams continue to use this formation, it has
received significant criticism for its ineffectiveness.5 The use of
this strategy almost always involves switching from a successful
defensive formation to a less tested one,6 and as a result, defenses
frequently allow offenses to score points and win the game.
Ignoring a valuable paradigm from one of the sports it regulates,
the NCAA recently switched to a preventative defensive strategy
by revising a scholarship bylaw in response to antitrust litigation
brought by student-athletes.
1 Prevent Defense, SPORTING CHARTS, http://www.sportingcharts.com/
dictionary/nfl/prevent-defense.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Famous football coach and NFL commentator John Madden once stated,
“The only thing prevent defense does is prevent you from winning.” See David Flemming,
In Defense of the Prevent, ESPN THE MAG., available at http://sports.espn.go.com/
espnmag/story?section=magazine&id=3837562 (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
5 Id.
6 Teams rarely utilize Prevent Defense throughout the game, but instead
solely resort to it at the end of the game when they have the lead. Id.
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The NCAA’s regulations have become “a self-protection
measure for the NCAA rather than carefully thought-out rules
to protect the student-athlete.”7 Not only do many of the
NCAA’s bylaws fail to protect student-athletes, but many also
place undue restrictions on student-athletes8 and even create
harm.9 Although the NCAA considers itself committed to
protecting athletes from the dangers of collegiate athletics,10 it
has recently faced scrutiny for failing to live up to its self-
proclaimed purpose.11 To seek redress, student-athletes have
challenged various NCAA bylaws in courtrooms throughout the
country, but have achieved limited success.12
An example of an unsuccessful challenge occurred in
Agnew v. NCAA.13 In this case, the plaintiff-appellants, former
college football players, challenged the NCAA’s prohibition of
multiyear athletic scholarship awards and the limit on the
total number of athletic scholarships a member institution can
offer.14 Plaintiff-appellants alleged that limiting athletic
scholarships to one year15 created anticompetitive effects on the
7 Mary Grace Miller, The NCAA and the Student-Athlete: Reform is on the
Horizon, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (2012).
8 See, e.g., DON YAEGER, UNDUE PROCESS: NCAA’S INJUSTICE FOR ALL
109-19 (1991).
9 The NCAA’s rules fail to take necessary preventive measures to protect
collegiate football players from concussions by allowing multiple full-contact practices a
week. The NFL, Pop Warner, and many high schools have instituted rules restricting the
number of contact practices allowed per week to one. As a result, a college football player
receives approximately 70% more contact to the head per season than a professional one.
Real Sports: Think About Them (HBO television broadcast Nov. 20, 2012).
10 This includes physical dangers, as well as the dangers of
commercialization. The NCAA revised the rules of play in collegiate football to make
the game safer, such as moving the kickoff starting line forward and banning the
shield-blocking scheme on punts. Rule Changes Become Official for Several Fall Sports,
NCAA.COM (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-08-27/rule-
changes-become-official-several-fall-season-sports; see also Money and March Madness:
Mark Emmert Interview, FRONTLINE (Feb. 14, 2011), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-and-march-madness/interviews/mark-
emmert.html [hereinafterMark Emmert Interview] (discussing how the NCAA works to
protect student-athletes from professionalism).
11 Miller, supra note 7, at 1150.
12 See Christian Dennie, Changing the Game: The Litigation That May Be the
Catalyst for Change in Intercollegiate Athletics, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 51 (2012).
13 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2012). See infra Part II.B, for
an in-depth discussion of the Agnew case.
14 “If a student’s athletic ability is considered in any degree in awarding
financial aid, such aid shall neither be awarded for a period in excess of one academic
year nor for a period less than one academic year.” NCAA, 2011–2012 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL: CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS art. 15.3.3.1, at
200 (2011) [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL].
15 After one year, universities, through the discretion of their coaching staffs,
had the option to renew a student’s athletic scholarship for an additional year. See Neil
Gibson, Note, NCAA Scholarship Restrictions as Anticompetitive Measures: The One-
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market and “prevented them from obtaining scholarships that
covered the entire cost of their college education,”16 thereby
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.17 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the NCAA
and upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the claim.18
Despite the dismissal,19 the NCAA subsequently removed
its ban on multiyear scholarships. In October 2011, NCAA’s
Division I board of directors20 adopted a proposal to permit
multiyear scholarship offers to Division I student-athletes.21 Some
critics feel the change is a “huge step toward meaningful
reform,”22 but unfortunately this is a mischaracterization. The
NCAA—following its historical priority of escaping scrutiny from
courts and governmental agencies23—enacted a superficial policy
that merely provides schools the opportunity to offer multiyear
scholarships and fails to resolve the problem of lost scholarships
due to an injury or a coach’s boundless discretion.24
In addition to insufficiently protecting student-athletes,
the new policy undermines the NCAA’s traditional legal
defenses of preservation of amateurism and maintenance of
competitive balance, which it has used to thwart antitrust
Year Rule and Scholarship Caps as Avenues for Antitrust Scrutiny, 3 WM. & MARY BUS.
L. REV. 203, 205-07 (2012).
16 Michael P. Tremoglie, Seventh Circuit: NCAA Does Not Violate Antitrust
Law, LEGAL NEWSLINE (June 20, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/news/
236512-seventh-circuit-ncaa-does-not-violate-antitrust-law.
17 Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it illegal for any person to
engage in a contract, combination, or conspiracy that places an unreasonable restraint
on a market or trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
18 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 332-34.
19 Id.
20 “This measure” was not mandated “from university presidents, court cases, or
other influential sources.” Miller, supra note 7, 1155; see also Steve Wieberg, Multiyear
Scholarship Rule Narrowly Survives Override Vote, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2012, 7:00 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-02-17/multiyear-scholarships-
survives-close-vote/53137194/1.
21 “The new rule would allow scholarships to be awarded for as little as two
years, for junior college transfers, or as long as four or five years for incoming
freshmen.” Multiyear Scholarship Plan Moves On, ESPN (Feb. 17, 2012, 7:37 PM),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7587582/challenge-ncaa-multiyear-
scholarship-plan-falls-short.
22 Allen L. Sack, Making Peace with the NCAA, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 22,
2012, 2:59 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/03/22/essay-longtime-critic-
applauds-ncaa-action-multiyear-scholarships-athletes.
23 See YAEGER, supra note 8, at 159-61.
24 See Josh Levin, The Most Evil Thing About College Sports, SLATE (May
17, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/05/ncaa_
scholarship_rules_it_s_morally_indefensible_that_athletic_scholarships_can_be_
yanked_after_one_year_for_any_reason_.html.
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litigation.25 The new rule erodes the NCAA’s principle of
amateurism by allowing universities to compete for recruits
with athletic scholarships of different lengths. This imposes a
monetary value on an athlete’s ability,26 and inadvertently
acknowledges the possibility of a labor market for student-athletes,
which plaintiffs have struggled to identify in past antitrust
litigation.27 Moreover, it encourages unconscionable employee-like
contract negotiations that place student-athletes’ academic and
athletic goals in direct conflict. Finally, the new rule marks the
abandonment of the NCAA’s long-held position that the ban on
multiyear scholarships was necessary to prevent schools with
greater financial resources from gaining an unfair advantage and
thus maintain a competitive balance in college athletics.
This note argues that by eroding its traditional legal
defenses, the NCAA exposes itself to stronger antitrust claims by
student-athletes and demonstrates that the NCAA’s policy
considerations focus on protecting the commercialization of
college athletics, not student-athletes. The first section of this
note will provide background information that details the history
of the NCAA’s athletic scholarship policies, focusing primarily on
collegiate football. Part II will discuss the antitrust litigation that
motivated the NCAA’s policy shift. It will also highlight the ways
in which the NCAA utilizes its procompetitive justifications of
amateurism and maintenance of competitive balance. Part III will
discuss how the effect of the NCAA’s change in scholarship policy
undermines its legal defenses, leaving the NCAA susceptible to
stronger antitrust claims. Part IV will address the inability of the
policy to effectuate reform that protects student-athletes and
discuss the shortsightedness of the NCAA’s attempt to protect
itself against antitrust litigation. Finally, this note will explore
the benefits of adopting a mandatory multiyear scholarship that
guarantees all student-athletes at least four years of athletic
scholarship, so long as they maintain academic eligibility and a
willingness to participate on the team.
25 Provided that the plaintiff proves anticompetitive effects or behavior of the
defendant, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to show the merits of his or her
activity by pointing out its procompetitive elements. In other words, the defendant
must show that, on balance, the restraint in question functions to enhance
competition.” Gibson, supra note 15, at 223-26; see infra Part II.C. The Supreme Court
has recognized preservation of amateurism and maintenance of competitive balance as
legitimate procompetitive justifications for regulations that create anticompetitive
effects. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)
[hereinafter Bd. of Regents].
26 The value is determined by the number of expense-covered years the
scholarship awards. See infra Part III.
27 See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2012).
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I. THENCAA AND ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIPS
A. The Founding of the NCAA and Its Principles
Over a century ago, the NCAA developed as the governing
body for major collegiate sports, specifically college football, which
it continues to service today. Due to the “rugged, violent, and
deadly” nature of college football in the early twentieth century,
President Theodore Roosevelt called for attempts to “reduce the
brutality of the game.”28 In December 1905, representatives from
62 schools created the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States (IAAUS), a formal organization dedicated to
formulating rules and regulations for collegiate athletics.29 The
organization, which was renamed the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) in 1912, created a football committee that
focused on devising rules to alleviate the game’s violence, and
ultimately make football “more palatable to the general public.”30
Although reducing violence was the impetus that led to
the creation of the NCAA, the immediate rise of a national
market for collegiate football required the NCAA to focus its
attention on amateurism and eligibility rules as early as its
initial meeting.31 The NCAA made the determination that
college athletics were for the “amateur athlete,” or someone
who “competed only for [the] symbolic or intrinsic benefits”32
that playing a sport provides. This differentiated the amateur
athlete from the paid professional athlete and led the NCAA to
ban offering any financial incentive—including athletic
scholarships—to recruit an athlete to attend a particular
university.33 But the NCAA lacked the policing resources to
enforce these restrictions, which essentially left the regulation
28 Ray Yasser, Competition On and Off The Field: An Analysis of the Role of
Antitrust Law in the Continuing Evolution of Professional Sports and Intercollegiate
Athletics: The Case for Reviving the Four-Year Deal, 86 TUL. L. REV. 987, 990-91 (2012).
29 See ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR
HIRE: THE EVOLUTION AND LEGACYOF THENCAA’S AMATEURMYTH 33 (1998).
30 Id.
31 The NCAA wanted to keep college sports for college students, and prevent
skilled professional athletes from “parading under college colors” and “receiving
pay . . . for [their] athletic prowess.” The increase in a national market made this
difficult because there were high stakes, such as “national prestige and large amounts
of money,” available to winning programs. Id. at 34.
32 Id.
33 Article VI of the NCAA’s 1906 bylaws stated that member institutions must take
measures “to prevent violations of amateur principles,” including “the offering of inducements
to players to enter college or universities because of their athletic abilities or supporting or
maintaining players while students on account of their athletic abilities, either by athletic
organizations, individual alumni, or otherwise, directly or indirectly.” Id. at 33.
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of universities to an honor system and created an atmosphere
conducive to perpetual violations.34
Without an effective enforcement mechanism, member
institutions defied the regulations that were supposed to
protect the principles of amateurism, resulting in college
athletes who closely resembled professional athletes. Teams
felt pressured to violate the rules because there were no
guarantees that their competitors would abide, and compliance
placed them at a competitive disadvantage.35 Having a successful
team was of the utmost importance because it “created a revenue
base, strong ties to their communities, willing investors, and
media coverage.”36 As a result, universities moved away from the
NCAA’s idealized vision of athletic programs—a place where
amateur athletes played sports as beloved hobbies to supplement
their education, unencumbered by contemptible financial
incentives.37 Instead, universities cultivated an environment
where “[a]thletes were putting in long hours of intensive and
specialized training to meet the entertainment needs of
thousands of discriminating fans” and were provided monetary
support for their efforts.38
B. The Creation of the Student-Athlete and Athletic
Scholarship
As early as the 1930s, the NCAA attempted to enact
regulations to maintain the illusion that college athletes were
unpaid amateurs. At this time, supporters of universities, or
boosters, would commonly “adopt a local high school athlete and
‘put him through college.’”39 According to a study by the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, “subsidization of
athletes in some form or another took place at 81 of the 112
colleges and universities studied.”40 In 1948, to stop private
payments to athletes, the NCAA abandoned its previous
position and endorsed athletic scholarships.41 Under the NCAA
34 See Mechelle Voepel, College Athletes Are Already Getting Paid, ESPN (July 18,
2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/columns/story?columnist=voepel_mechelle&id=6739971;
see also SACK&STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 35-40 (comparing NCAA’s amateur code to the
Eighteenth Amendment).
35 See SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 35-37.
36 Yasser, supra note 28, at 992.
37 SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 35.
38 Id.
39 WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE
ATHLETICS 65 (1995).
40 SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 36.
41 Id. at 42; see also BYERS, supra note 39, at 65.
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scholarship policy, known as the Sanity Code,42 “a student-athlete
could receive tuition and fees if he showed financial need and met
the school’s ordinary entrance requirements; this amounted to a
merit award for athletic ability.”43 With the adoption of the Sanity
Code, the NCAA hoped to protect its notion of amateurism and
gain control over growing collegiate athletics.44 Similar to earlier
regulations, the NCAA lacked the capability to enforce the Sanity
Code and establish punishment for violations, which occurred
openly.45 Due to its ineffectiveness, the NCAA renounced the
Sanity Code in 1951, and consequently left a void in athletic
scholarship regulation.46
The lapse in regulation did not last long as the NCAA
solidified the foundation of the modern athletic scholarship in
order to avoid potentially costly litigation. Although debate
continued to rage over the emergence of athletic scholarships and
whether it amounted to “pay for play,” a new problem
overshadowed this concern.47 Courts indicated that they might
view NCAA athletes as employees, which posed a significant
problem for colleges because such a determination would force
them to provide Workmen’s Compensation benefits to injured
players.48 According to these courts, under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, if athletes were given scholarships that
paid for tuition and were contingent on their participation in a
sport, then these arrangements qualified as employment
contracts.49 Under this immense and potentially costly
pressure, universities across the country united to make a
42 The Sanity Code was “named in part after a delegate at a previous [NCAA]
Convention who called for ‘a return to sanity’ with regard to members following
established rules[,] which contains strict regulations regarding financial aid,
recruiting, academic standards, institutional control and amateurism.” Chronology of
Enforcement, NCAA.ORG, available at http://archive.is/Ea1B (last visited May 6, 2014).
43 BYERS, supra note 39, at 67. In addition, “[an athlete] could receive a
scholarship exceeding tuition and fees regardless of need if he ranked in the upper 25
percent of his high school graduating class or maintained a B average in college.” Id.
44 See id. at 67-69; see also SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 44-46.
45 Seven schools refused to comply with the Sanity Code, including “Boston
College, the Citadel, Villanova, Virginia Military Institute, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, the University of Maryland, and the University of Virginia,” but they were
not expelled from the NCAA because the major Southern Conferences threatened to
secede. SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 46.
46 BYERS, supra note 39, at 68.
47 Id. at 68-69.
48 See, e.g., Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963);
Fort Lewis A&M State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957);
Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
49 Van Horn, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169; Fort Lewis A&M State Comp. Ins. Fund, 314
P.2d 288; Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423.
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determination that college athletics were only for “amateurs.”50
To reinforce this notion, the NCAA created the term “student-
athlete” to establish a clear demarcation between college
athletes and employees (professional athletes), inserting the
term pervasively throughout its rules and regulations.51 As a
result of the NCAA’s propagation, the courts and the public
began using the term “student-athlete” ubiquitously.52
As an additional measure to prevent Workmen’s
Compensation litigation, the NCAA instituted a revised
athletic scholarship policy that covered only the expenses
associated with attending college.53 The hope was that if a
player did not receive compensation beyond the cost of
education, then there was no payment as an employee.54
Although the NCAA alleged that the revitalization of “true
amateurism”55 motivated this change, the NCAA’s then-director
Walter Byers later admitted, “[T]he campaign had nothing to
do with the noble ideal of amateurism, but rather addressed
the practical consequences of litigation involving worker’s
rights.”56 The new approach failed to stop under-the-table
payments to players, diverted alumni and booster money from
players to universities, and pushed collegiate athletics further
down the path of commercialization, corruption, and unfairness.57
The superficial protective measures merely succeeded in
establishing a legal foundation for the NCAA to protect itself from
claims that alleged collegiate athletes deserved employee-status.58
50 BYERS, supra note 39, at 69.
51 See id.
52 Id.
53 This included “room, board, tuition, fees, books, and $15 a month for
laundry for nine months.” Yasser, supra note 28, at 995.
54 See BYERS, supra note 39, at 72. A position that has stood the test of time,
as current president of the NCAA explained in an interview, “We don’t pay our
student-athletes . . . . We provide them with remarkable opportunities to get an
education at the finest universities on earth.” Mark Emmert Interview, supra note 10.
55 The NCAA advised member institutions to make recruits sign a statement
agreeing with the principles of amateurism, and acknoledging that no employment-
duty was created from the fact that scholarships were often contingent on athletic
participation. BYERS, supra note 39, at 75.
56 Yasser, supra note 28, at 995. As one commentator observed: “[F]ull-ride
athletic scholarship was a marriage of convenience for the NCAA—it made the whole
arrangement ‘legal.’” Yasser, supra note 28, at 995-96.
57 See BYERS, supra note 39, at 73.
58 Similarly, the NCAA is crafting new laws, such as the discretionary
multiyear scholarship offer to avoid continued antitrust litigation. This is as opposed to
addressing the issues that student-athletes rights are being violated. See infra Part III.
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C. The End of Multiyear Scholarships
The NCAA’s decision to limit the length of athletic
scholarships also resulted from an attempt to minimize the
costs of collegiate athletics and to increase revenue. From the
1950s to the 1970s, the NCAA’s regulations failed to limit the
term of years of an athletic scholarship and the total number of
athletic scholarships an institution could award.59 Although
this allowed institutions to award multiyear scholarships, it
also set the stage for the elimination of this practice.60
Some colleges were offering only one-year grants to recruits, who
were being wooed away by colleges offering ‘no-cut’ four-year
grants . . . . [These] one-year recruiters, who believed that the four-
year scholarship colleges had too big an advantage . . . motivat[ed] [ ]
a not-so-subtle campaign among big-time coaches and athletic
directors to place control of athletes’ grants in the hands of coaches
instead of scholarship committees.61
Players increasingly frustrated coaches when they quit
or were injured because the coaches could not strip them of
their scholarships.62 This, in conjunction with the ever-rising
flood of television money and escalating rewards for winning,
bred the mentality that scholarships should only go to players
who contributed on the field.63
In January 1973, institutions and coaches asserted their
authority by eliminating the multiyear scholarship and
limiting scholarships to the one-year renewable offer.64 The
motive behind eliminating multiyear scholarships derived from
cutting the cost of “deadwood”65 and providing coaches with
more control to build winning programs.66 The NCAA, however,
framed this as a measure to facilitate a competitive balance
and ensure that the recruiting process did not disadvantage
universities.67 They argued that a uniform scholarship rule
would reduce the recruiting disparity between universities
offering only one-year scholarships and those offering
59 Louis Hakim, The Student-Athlete vs. the Athlete Student: Has the Time
Arrived for an Extended-Term Scholarship Contract, 2 VA. J. SPORTS&L. 145, 158 (2000).
60 See Yasser, supra note 28, at 996.
61 See BYERS, supra note 39, at 75-76.
62 Yasser, supra note 28, at 1001-03.
63 See BYERS, supra note 39, at 76.
64 Yasser, supra note 28, at 1002.
65 “Deadwood” is defined as: Players who received athletic scholarships, but
whose contributions to the team were considered unsatisfactory by coaches because they
were not as athletically gifted as anticipated or got injured. BYERS, supra note 39, at 76.
66 Yasser, supra note 28, at 1003.
67 See Hakim, supra note 59, at 158.
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extended-term scholarships, thus establishing the maintenance
of competitive balance legal defense. 68 Further, the NCAA
claimed the new scholarship policy supported the ideal of
amateurism because individuals who maintained their
scholarship, but were no longer on the team received benefits
that went beyond expenses.69
The one-year deal existed for more than 40 years, but
coaches continued to commonly use the term “full-ride” while
recruiting players.70 Even though the NCAA’s bylaws forbid
anything more than a one-year scholarship with the option of
renewal, coaches assured promising high school student-athletes
that these grants would be renewed so long as the student
continued to participate on the team and remain eligible.71 This
once again sounded precariously similar to an employment
contract, but the NCAA established a formal requirement that
student-athletes sign a letter of intent that reinforced the
amateur agreement.72
With the letter of intent in place, athletic scholarships
became binding contracts.73 Student-athletes’ protection under
these contracts lasted for only one academic year, after which
schools were free to release players from a team and vacate
their scholarships.74 As a result,
One-year renewable scholarships have provided the burgeoning
college sports industry with a reliable and disciplined source of
cheap labor . . . . It is difficult to overstate the kinds of demands
coaches can make on players as a condition for the yearly renewal of
financial aid. Coaches ask that athletes play with injury, and control
their lives on and off the field. Because each season is a tryout for
financial aid the next, sports takes priority. An NCAA survey carried
out a few years ago found that big-time college football players spend
68 Id.
69 SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 82-84.
70 Levin, supra note 24 (dispelling the notion that athletic scholarships are
always a four-year guaranteed education or full ride).
71 See Hakim, supra note 59, at 172-73.
72 BYERS, supra note 39, at 75.
73 See generally Sean Hanlon, Athletic Scholarship as Unconscionable
Contracts of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 41 (2006)
(explaining how the athletic-scholarship developed into a recognized contract). The
letter of intent also requires that student-athletes sign their respective school’s Statement of
Financial Aid, which defines the terms, conditions, and amount of the athletic award.
Although the Statement of Financial Aid is made between each school and their respective
scholarship athletes, the actual Statements of Financial Aid are uniform contracts that do
not vary from school to school. Id. at 69-70.
74 Yasser, supra note 28, at 1003.
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an average of 44.8 hours a week on their sport in addition to time in
the classroom.75
As Ray Yasser aptly stated, despite these demands, “The school’s
only obligation to an athlete who gives his or her blood, sweat, and
tears is to notify promptly the athlete of the nonrenewal decision.”76
Under this system the NCAA has grown into “a voluntary
unincorporated association that governs more than 1,200 colleges,
universities, athletic conferences, and sports organizations;
380,000 student-athletes; and eighty-eight championship events
in three divisions.”77 A more accurate portrayal of the NCAA is a
commercialized big business that benefits the NCAA, member
institutions, corporate sponsors, and everyone else except those
whose skills are marketed.78 The biggest collegiate sports such as
football and men’s basketball “generate more than $6 billion in
annual revenue,” a profit exceeding some professional sports.79
College coaches can earn a salary as high as or higher than
professional coaches.80 The commercialization of collegiate
athletics, focus on profit maximization, and continuous scandals81
indicate that the NCAA has strayed from its stated goals to
“promote student-athletes and college sports through public
awareness . . . [,] protect student-athletes through standards of
fairness and integrity . . . [,] prepare student-athletes for lifetime
75 Sack, supra note 22.
76 Yasser, supra note 28, at 1003.
77 Dennie, supra note 12, at 16.
78 Miller noted,
Yet the student-athlete sees none of the money that exchanges hands as a
result of his or her performance. For instance, big college football
teams . . . bring in between $40 million and $80 million in profits a year, even
after paying coaches multimillion-dollar salaries. The student-athlete is
granted a scholarship that often fails to cover the true cost of living, and thus
he or she frequently lives below the poverty line. The student-athlete is
exploited.
Miller, supra note 7, at 1143.
79 Joe Nocero, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-
college-athletes.html?pagewanted=all.
80 “Ohio State just agreed to pay Urban Meyer $24 million over six years.” Id.
81 Miller noted,
Scandals have recently crowded the newspapers and sports blogs with stories
of one football player or another selling his own jersey for a profit or
accepting money from a booster. These scandals are unnerving because the
NCAA’s bylaws strictly prohibit a student-athlete from profiting from his or
her athletic performance.
Miller, supra note 7, at 1144.
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leadership, and provide student-athletes and college sports with
the funding to help meet these goals.”82
D. The Return of the Multiyear Option
In October 2011, the NCAA’s Division I board of
directors adopted a proposal to change their policy on athletic
scholarships.83 The new rule, which allows schools the option to
provide multiyear scholarships, went into effect immediately,
and by National Signing Day84 in February 2012 some schools
already offered multiyear scholarships.85 Although a few schools
signed student-athletes to multiyear scholarships, a majority of
member institutions met the overnight change of the four-
decade-old scholarship policy with resistance.86 A substantial
number of member institutions formally opposed the new rule
and demanded a repeal vote.87 The option to offer multiyear
scholarship barely survived the repeal vote—“[o]f 330 institutions
voting, 62.12 percent voted to override the legislation. A 62.5
percent majority of those voting was required to override
legislation.”88 The opposing member institutions failed to gain the
two extra votes necessary to repeal the new rule, and thus schools
retain the option to make multiyear rather than one-year offers.89
The NCAA, led by its current president Mark Emmert,
argues that elimination of the prohibition on multiyear
scholarships is part of a larger initiative to enhance athletes’
welfare.90 Such an explanation ignores the tradition of the
NCAA’s policy changes. History suggests that the change
results from the NCAA’s attempt to avoid antitrust claims by
82 Dennie, supra note 12, at 16-17.
83 Multiyear Scholarship Plan Moves On, supra note 21; see also Gibson,
supra note 15, at 242.
84 A specified date designated by a number of the major football conferences,
where recruits sign letters of intent and commit to attend particular universities. Rod
Goldberg, National Signing Day 2013: Predicting Where Top Uncommitted Prospects
Will Sign, BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 15, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1486603-
national-signing-day-2013-predicting-where-top-uncommitted-prospects-will-sign.
85 “Including Ohio State, Auburn, Michigan, Michigan State, Florida and
Nebraska.” Multiyear Scholarship Plan Moves On, supra note 21.
86 See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Multiyear Scholarships To Be Allowed,
NCAA.COM (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-02-17/multiyear-
scholarships-be-allowed; see also Multiyear Scholarship Plan Moves On, supra note 21.
87 See Hosick, supra note 86.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See Mark Emmert Interview, supra note 10; see also Allie Grasgreen,
New Day for Division I Athletes, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 28, 2011, 3:00 AM),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/10/28/ncaa-board-approves-athletic-eligibility-
rules-division-i-athletes.
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student-athletes that directly challenged the bylaw,91 and the
attention that the bylaw garnered from United States
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, who “informed the
NCAA a little less than two years ago that it was looking into the
single-year restriction and whether it restrained competition
among schools for top players.”92 Yet, the NCAA’s strategic
attempt to insulate itself from antitrust litigation comes at the
cost of abandoning its most common legal defenses: preservation
of amateurism and maintenance of competitive balance.
II. ANTITRUST SCRUTINY AND THENCAA
The NCAA continues to enforce bylaws that create
restrictions and requirements for student-athletes that essentially
treat them as an unpaid labor force and leave them powerless to
seek recourse internally.93 As a result, student-athletes resort to
filing lawsuits that claim the NCAA’s bylaws place unreasonable
restraints on them.94 Because of this tension, the NCAA has been
“no stranger to protracted litigation and has been involved in a
plethora of lawsuits relating to nearly every conceivable area of the
law.”95 The NCAA, however, has a strong tradition of success in the
courtroom, including antitrust litigation.96
Student-athletes often bring claims against the NCAA for
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,”97 that creates an
unreasonable restraint on trade is illegal.98 To succeed in an
antitrust litigation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff
must prove a contract, combination or conspiracy, an
unreasonable restraint on trade in a relevant market, and an
injury.99
91 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
92 Wieberg, supra note 20.
93 SeeMiller, supra note 7, at 1150.
94 Dennie, supra note 12, at 22.
95 Id.
96 “Since the mid-1970s, plaintiffs have brought a great number of antitrust
claims against the NCAA before federal courts. Only twice, however, have these courts
recognized NCAA violations of the Sherman Act, first in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma, and later in Law v. NCAA.” Gibson, supra note 15, 208 n.22. This
is in large part due to the NCAA’s time-honored legal defenses of amateurism and
maintenance of competitive balance. See Dennie, supra note 12, at 22.
97 15 U.S.C § 1 (2012).
98 See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)
(interpreting 15 U.S.C § 1).
99 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Denny’s
Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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The NCAA faced challenges under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act with increased frequency following Board of
Regents,100 the seminal and successful application of antitrust
principles to the NCAA.101 In Board of Regents, the Supreme
Court determined that the NCAA violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act by restricting “both the quantity of college
football games televised and the number of televised games
allowed to a given team in a single season.”102 The Court also
established a precedent that “the NCAA is not exempt from the
strictures of the Sherman Act merely because it is a nonprofit
entity,” and further indicated that “all the regulations passed by
the NCAA are subject to the Sherman Act.”103 Despite the Court’s
language that “all” regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny,
courts continue to struggle to apply the Sherman Act to the
NCAA’s bylaws.104
A. A Dichotomous Antitrust Approach to the NCAA
The difficulties courts face in applying the Sherman Act
to the NCAA’s bylaws largely stem from the dichotomous
approach adopted after Board of Regents.105 Rather than apply
a single approach to all NCAA regulations, the courts
established a “two-pronged antitrust approach.”106 The first
approach applies to cases that involve obvious commercial
restraints, such as output and price restraints on televised
college football.107 With obvious commercial restraints, Board of
Regents established precedent to apply a stringent balancing test
that weighs the plaintiff ’s anticompetitive complaint against the
defendant’s procompetitive justifications to determine if the
regulation creates an unreasonable restraint.108
The second approach applies to regulations that promote
noncommercial goals, such as rules of play and eligibility.109 This
100 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
101 Id.
102 Gibson, supra note 15, at 228.
103 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 338-39 (describing the interpretation and legacy of the
Board of Regents decision).
104 See, e.g., Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist, 86 OR. L. REV. 329 (2007).
105 See generally id. (explaining the dichotomous approach courts use in
assessing antitrust litigation against the NCAA).
106 Id. at 340.
107 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
108 See Lazaroff, supra note 104, at 340.
109 See Yasser, supra note 28, at 1011; see also Chad W. Pekron, The
Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in
NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 37 (2000).
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approach derived from Justice Stevens’s “now famous (perhaps
infamous) dicta” 110 in Board of Regents:
The identification of this “product” with an academic tradition
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable . . . .
In order to preserve the character and quality of the “product,”
athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the
like. And the integrity of the “product” cannot be preserved except by
mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions
unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field
might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in
enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result
enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be
unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen consumer
choice—not only the choices available to sports fans but also those
available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.111
Courts interpreted this language to establish a more lenient
standard for the NCAA in advancing procompetitive justifications.
Despite the fact that noncommercial regulations may place
economic restraints on student-athletes, courts accept, without
demonstration by the NCAA, that these rules are justified by
preservation of amateurism or maintenance of competitive of
balance.112 That a number of district courts held that various
bylaws pertaining to student-athlete eligibility do not violate
antitrust regulation exemplifies the leniency of this approach.113
The Supreme Court, however, has never determined
“whether and when the Sherman Act applies to the NCAA and its
member schools in relation to their interaction with student-
athletes.”114 Because the Supreme Court has not weighed directly
on the issue, student-athletes continue to use antitrust law as an
avenue to challenge the restrictions imposed upon them.
Recently, “lower federal courts are also beginning to blur the
distinction between restraints on players and restraints on other
actors.”115 One of the claims that appears strongly situated to
110 Lazaroff, supra note 104, at 339.
111 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02.
112 See Lazaroff, supra note 104, at 339 (referencing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85).
113 See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Gaines
v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
114 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 339 (7th Cir. 2012).
115 In fact,
In some cases, antitrust claims have been rejected summarily because jurists
have determined that antitrust laws have no application to restraints on
amateur student-athletes. In other cases, courts have engaged in antitrust
analyses but concluded that the NCAA acted lawfully in imposing restraints.
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demonstrate that an NCAA bylaw violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Act is the challenge to the previous ban on multiyear
scholarships.
B. Antitrust Challenges to Athletic Scholarship Bylaws
Agnew v. NCAA116 applied Section 1 of the Sherman Act to
NCAA scholarship bylaws, and provided the context in which the
NCAA utilizes its legal defenses of amateurism and maintenance of
a competitive balance. In this case, NCAA student-athletes
Joseph Agnew and Patrick Courtney directly attacked the
NCAA’s limitation on athletic-scholarships, claiming that the
NCAA’s bylaws that limit athletic scholarships to one-year117
and the total number of athletic scholarships available118
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.119 Both Agnew, who
played football for Rice University in 2006, and Courtney, who
played for North Carolina A&T in 2009, received one-year
athletic scholarships to play football at their respective
universities.120 Unfortunately, Agnew and Courtney suffered
career-ending injuries while playing football during their
college tenures, and their universities exercised the right to not
renew these players’ scholarships.121 Agnew and Courtney sued
the NCAA, claiming the imposed cap “on the number of
scholarships given per team and the prohibition of multi-year
scholarships prevented them from obtaining scholarships that
covered the entire cost of their college education.”122 The plaintiffs
alleged that this violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act because,
absent these restrictions, colleges would offer multi-year
scholarships to stay competitive, and they would have received
them.123 In response, “the NCAA filed a motion to dismiss
claiming that the plaintiffs failed to identify a relevant market,
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the NCAA injured
Further, some courts have suggested that, at least at the preliminary stages
of litigation, NCAA athlete claims can move forward.
Lazaroff, supra note 104, at 344.
116 See Agnew, 683 F.3d 328.
117 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 14, at 200.
118 Id. at 207.
119 Agnew, 683 F.3d 328.
120 Id. at 332.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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competition in a relevant market, and failed to allege facts
sufficient to show an injury.”124
The first element in an antitrust challenge requires a
plaintiff student-athlete to demonstrate “a contract, combination,
or conspiracy.”125 “[T]he NCAA is a voluntary unincorporated
association that governs more than 1,200 colleges, universities,
athletic conferences, and sports organization,”126 which
promulgates “rules and regulations to monitor a variety of issues
facing member institutions, conferences, student-athletes, and
coaches, including bylaws governing amateurism, recruiting,
eligibility, financial aid, and practice and playing seasons.”127
As the court in Agnew stated, the member institutions have
unquestionably agreed to abide by these rules and regulations,
and therefore the showing of an agreement is not an issue
when student-athletes challenge a bylaw.128
The second element requires a plaintiff student-athlete
to demonstrate “an unreasonable restraint of trade in a
relevant market.”129 To do so, the plaintiff must first establish a
relevant market. Agnew and Courtney attempted to challenge
the NCAA scholarship regulation as a restriction on the market
for bachelor’s degrees.130 This is not typically the focus of
challenges to Section 1 of the Sherman Act and it proved fatal to
Agnew and Courtney’s claim. The district court held that the
bachelor’s degree market was not a cognizable market under the
Sherman Act because bachelor’s degrees cannot be bought
through tuition payments.131 Rather, bachelor’s degrees are
earned by satisfying requirements, and student-athletes are only
provided an opportunity to fulfill these requirements.132 There is
no exchange of a bachelor degree for participation on the athletic
field.133 The district court also foreclosed the possibility that a
student-athlete labor market could be a cognizable market and
dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.134
124 Id. at 333.
125 Id. at 335 (quoting Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods. Inc., 8 F.3d 1217,
1220 (7th Cir. 1993)).
126 Dennie, supra note 12, at 16.
127 Id. at 17.
128 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335.
129 Id. (quoting Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220
(7th Cir. 1993)).
130 Id. at 333.
131 Id. at 338.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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On appeal, the court emphasized that the plaintiffs must
“describe the rough contours of the relevant market in which
anticompetitive effects may be felt.”135 Plaintiffs failed to meet this
burden for both the market for bachelor’s degrees and the market
for student-athlete labor. The Agnew court suggested that “[t]he
proper identification of a labor market for student-
athletes . . . would meet plaintiff ’s burden of describing a
cognizable market under the Sherman Act.”136 This contradicted a
prior decision, which dismissed the argument that scholarship
athletes could be considered a labor market because “schools do
not engage in price competition for players,”137 “the value of [a]
scholarship is based upon the school’s tuition and room and
board,”138 and supply and demand does not determine the worth of
student-athletes’ labor.139 The Agnew court recognized that a
market was certainly at play, stating “a transaction clearly occurs
between a student-athlete and a university: the student-athlete
uses his athletic abilities on behalf of the university in exchange
for an athletic and academic education, room, and board.”140 This
dictum provides support for recognizing a nationwide labor
market for student-athletes under the Sherman Act,141 and
contradicts the belief that bylaws affecting student-athletes, such
as scholarship policies are not commercial.142 Similarly, the Agnew
court stated, “No knowledgeable observer could earnestly assert
that big-time college football programs competing for highly
135 Id. at 345.
136 Id. at 346.
137 Id. at 346 (citing Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992)).
138 Banks, 977 F.2d 1091.
139 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 346 (citing Banks, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091).
140 Id. at 338.
141 It is important to note that it would not be enough for a plaintiff class to simply
“write the words ‘nationwide labor market for student athletes’ on paper.” Order Granting
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010, (S.D. Ind. 2013)
(No. 12-CV-1019). Instead, a plaintiff “must properly identify the labor market at issue,
plead its rough contours, or account for the commercial reality of the transaction.” Id.
142 The belief that scholarship and eligibility rules are not commercial is “an
outmoded image of intercollegiate sports that no longer jibes with reality.” Agnew, 683 F.3d
at 340 (quoting Banks, 977 F.2d at 1099 (Flaum, J., dissenting)). The Seventh Circuit seems
to accept this dictum. The Seventh Circuit followed the Agnew court’s guidance in resolving
the NCAA’s motion to dismiss in Rock v. NCAA, stating that:
[T]he NCAA’s one-year scholarship limit and the cap on the number of
scholarships are financial aid rules, not eligibility rules. As financial aid rules,
those bylaws ‘are not inherently or obviously necessary for the preservation of
amateurism, the student-athlete, or the general product of college football.
Accordingly, unlike eligibility rules, financial aid rules are not deserving of a
procompetitive presumption . . . at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 7, Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d
1010, (S.D. Ind. 2013) (No. 12-CV-1019).
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sought-after high school football players do not anticipate
economic gain from successful recruiting program.”143
Although the Agnew court recognized that the labor
market for student-athletes may be cognizable under the
Sherman Act, which will likely provide guidance to future
student-athlete plaintiffs to properly identify relevant market,
such as the class in Rock v. NCAA,144 it stated that the NCAA
bylaws prohibiting multiyear scholarships and limiting the
number of scholarships do not necessarily violate the Sherman
Act.145 Future plaintiffs still need to prove the additional
component that these regulatory controls are an unreasonable
restraint. Despite the fact that the climate is changing, the legacy
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents suggests that
there is still “a presumption in favor of certain NCAA rules when
it stated: It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory
controls of the NCAA are . . . procompetitive because they
enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics.”146
Furthermore, the Court suggests that many of the NCAA bylaws
are necessary to distinguish and preserve the “character and
quality of the product.”147
C. Unreasonable Restraint and the Rule of Reason
Typically, the focus of Section 1 Sherman Act cases is
whether a regulation poses an unreasonable restraint. To
determine whether a restraint is unreasonable, courts “focus on
the competitive effects of challenged behavior relative to such
143 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341.
144 The named plaintiff John Rock represents a class of individuals who
received an athletic-based scholarship for at least one year and had it reduced or not
renewed, and subsequently was forced to pay tuition. Rock was an accomplished high
school quarterback, who attended Gardner-Webb University in North Carolina on a
football scholarship. Despite having been the team’s starting quarterback and captain,
Rock’s scholarship was revoked when the school replaced the head coach. Like in Agnew, the
plaintiff alleges that had it not been for the NCAA’s prohibition on multiyear scholarships
and the limit on the overall number of scholarships a university can offer, he would have
received a scholarship that covered the full cost of his education. The focus of the
complaint addresses the labor market for student-athletes as the relevant market, and
the bylaws as an unreasonable restraint on that market, attempting to correct the
shortcomings of the plaintiff ’s in Agnew. Complaint at 3-6, Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp
2d 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (No. 12-CV-1019). The plaintiffs in Rock eventually amended
the original complaint to narrow the proposed market to the “market for the labor of
Division I football student athletes.” See infra note 173.
145 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341.
146 Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)).
147 The product the court refers to is college football.Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
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alternatives as its abandonment or a less restrictive substitute.”148
Courts apply a balancing test, known as the “rule of reason,” to
assess whether the NCAA bylaw that prohibits multiyear
scholarships creates an unreasonable restraint.149 The rule of
reason analysis has three criteria: First,
the plaintiff [must] show that the agreement has a substantially
adverse effect on the competition; [second], the defendant presents
some evidence of the procompetitive virtue of the challenged
behavior; [and third], the plaintiff shows that the challenged conduct
is not necessary to achieve the procompetitive justifications put forth
by defendant or that those justifications can be achieved in a less
restrictive manner.150
Under the first step in the rule of reason, the plaintiff
must show an actual restraint on the quantity and quality of
output and price.151 The restraint on multiyear scholarships
prevents member institutions and student-athletes from
constructing scholarship agreements that each might find more
favorable.152 The Rock complaint indicated,153 picking up where
the Agnew plaintiffs left off, that Bylaw 15.3.3.1154 is “a blatant
price-fixing agreement and restraint between member institutions
of the [NCAA]. For years, NCAA member institutions unlawfully
conspired to maintain the price of student-athletes’ labor at
artificially low levels by agreeing never to offer student-athletes
athletics-based scholarships of a duration in excess of one
year.”155 As the Rock complaint and the Agnew court suggest,
absent the limitation on scholarship offers, “member schools
would choose to alter the price of the opportunity being sold by
148 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335 (quoting Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1500, at
362-63 (1986)).
149 As one commentator points out, “Both the sport cases and the pervasive trend
in antitrust jurisprudence support th[e] conclusion” that courts will evaluate an NCAA
mandate under the rule of reason, even if price fixing, usually analyzed under the per se
approach, was implicated. Yasser, supra note 28, at 1010. The Court in Board of Regents
elucidated: “What is critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.” Bd. of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); Some horizontal restrains are necessary to the NCAA and its
member institutions if the product is to exist at all such as rules of the game, size of the
fields, etc. See generally Yasser, supra note 28.
150 Pekron, supra note 109, at 32-33.
151 Yasser, supra note 28, at 1011-25.
152 Id. at 1012.
153 See supra note 144.
154 Bylaw 15.3.3.1 limits scholarships to one year. It reads, “If a student’s
athletics ability is considered in any degree in awarding financial aid, such aid shall
neither be awarded for a period in excess of one academic year nor for a period less
than one academic year.” NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 14, at 200.
155 Complaint at 1, Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp 2d 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (No.
12-CV-1019).
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offering multiyear scholarships in order to compete more
effectively for talented players against schools that choose to
offer only one-year deals.”156 Prospective student-athlete
plaintiffs appear well situated to demonstrate that the bylaw is
a restraint on the market.157
The second step of the rule of reason shifts the burden
to the defendant to provide evidence that the restraint offers a
justifiable procompetitive effect.158 Under this step, the burden
falls on the NCAA to demonstrate that the one-year scholarship
rule provides “procompetitive effects that outweigh the
anticompetitive ones.”159 To meet its burden, the NCAA will
undoubtedly argue that the bylaw limiting scholarships to one year
“preserves amateurism and helps to maintain a competitive
balance.”160 Not only were these the principles on which the
NCAA instituted the rule, but the NCAA has also successfully used
these defenses in a number of cases.161 As the court stated in Board
of Regents, “maintaining a competitive balance among amateur
athletic teams is legitimate and important.”162 Additionally, courts
have upheld the “NCAA’s efforts to maintain a discernible line
between amateurism and professionalism and protect amateur
objectives,”163 as a procompetitive justification, despite the fact that
“the NCAA has not distilled amateurism to its purest form.”164
The last step of the rule of reason allows the plaintiff an
opportunity to demonstrate that the actual restraint is not
necessary or that it is overly restrictive.165 Although courts have
determined that the NCAA regulations dictating eligibility “fall
comfortably within the presumption of procompetitiveness,”
courts have also indicated that the prohibition on multiyear
scholarships falls into a separate category of rules.166 Unlike
eligibility regulations, the scholarship bylaw fails to distinguish
between professional and amateur sports. This distinction is
156 Yasser, supra note 28, at 1012.
157 Should a court, as the dicta in Agnew suggests, recognize the labor market
for student-athletes. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012).
158 Yasser, supra note 28, at 1013.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Gaines
v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
162 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
163 Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743.
164 McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345.
165 Pekron, supra note 109, at 31-34.
166 See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 343 (7th Cir. 2010); see also In re NCAA
I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
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necessary to preserve amateurism, because courts “consider
players who receive nothing more than educational costs in
return for their services to be ‘unpaid athletes.’”167 Therefore,
whether an athlete receives one or four years of scholarship grant
does not affect a court’s interpretation of whether he is a
professional or amateur.168 The court in Agnew further indicated
that the bylaw does not implicate maintenance of a competitive
balance, because the NCAA survived without a prohibition on
multiyear scholarships until 1973. Further, numerous other less
restrictive methods exist to achieve a competitive balance such as
restricting alumni donation or recruiting budgets.169 If a court
were to apply the rule of reason to the NCAA’s prohibition on
multiyear scholarships, a student-athlete plaintiff has a
reasonable case to prove that the bylaw fails the analysis.
D. Injury and Future Cases
Finally, to succeed in demonstrating that the NCAA’s
regulation violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff
student-athlete must demonstrate an accompanying injury.170
Plaintiffs challenging Bylaw 15.3.3.1 alleged that they would
have been able to secure a guaranteed four- or five-year
scholarship, which would have protected them from losing their
aid once they were injured or a coaching change occurred, had
it not been for prohibition on multiyear scholarships.171 Despite
the Agnew plaintiffs’ failure to assert a relevant market, the
court indicated that it is likely that the one-year scholarship
violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act.172 With the Agnew court’s
willingness to recognize a labor market for student-athletes if a
plaintiff properly identifies it, the Rock class has a better
opportunity to successfully challenge the bylaw than ever
before.173
167 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 344.
168 Id.
169 See Complaint at 8, Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp 2d 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2013)
(No. 12-CV-1019).
170 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335.
171 Id. at 332-33; see also Complaint, supra note 169, at 23.
172 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 345-47.
173 Initially, the Rock class struggled to get through the pleading stage. The
court granted the NCAA’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to
identify a legally cognizable market. The plaintiff’s alleged market, “labor market for
student athletes,” was fatally broad. The proposed market was too broad because it
lumped “all student-athletes into the same labor market without accounting for
germane differences such as gender and sport played.” Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d
1010, 1022 (S.D. Ind. 2013).
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III. PREVENTDEFENSE: A SHIFT FROM LEGALDEFENSES
By lifting the ban on multiyear scholarships in 2011, the
NCAA has attempted to insulate itself from antitrust litigation.
The new policy, which gives member institutions the option to
offer multiyear scholarships, comes at the cost of eroding the
NCAA’s most common legal defenses: preservation of amateurism
and maintenance of competitive balance. The new rule betrays
the NCAA’s ideal of amateurism by inadvertently acknowledging
a labor market for student-athletes; the rule quantifies a price on
their athletic ability, promotes competition over student-athletes,
and demonstrates that supply and demand govern the market.
In addition, the rule encourages unconscionable employee-like
contract negotiations that place student-athletes’ academic and
athletic goals in direct conflict. More blatantly, the new rule
abandons the NCAA’s argument that the one-year scholarship
provided the procompetitive effects necessary to maintain
competitive balance. The harsh resistance and attempt to
repeal the new policy by member institutions exemplifies this
abandonment and highlights the “legitimate concerns,” raised
by these schools, when the NCAA regulates haphazardly.174
A. Abandonment of Amateurism
Critics admonish the NCAA’s antiquated notion of
amateurism, argue that commercialization permeates NCAA, and
indicate that the only individuals prevented from benefitting from
the system are the student-athletes who generate billions of
dollars in revenue for the NCAA’s member institutions.175 In an
The court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint,
in which the plaintiffs revised their description of the proposed relevant market as follows:
The relevant market is the nationwide market for the labor of Division I
football student athletes. In this labor market, student athletes compete for
spots on Division I football athletic teams of NCAA member institutions, and
NCAA member institutions compete for the best Division I football collegiate
student athletes by paying in-kind benefits, namely, Division I football
scholarships, academic programs, access to training facilities, and instructions
from premier coaches.
Rock v. NCAA, No. 12-CV-1019, 2013 WL 4479815, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013).
By narrowing the relevant market to one sport and one division, the court
found that the amended complaint “pled the rough contours of a relevant market that
is plausible on its face”; and thus the court rejected the NCAA’s motion to dismiss.
Rock, 2013 WL 4479815, at *14.
174 Wieberg, supra note 20.
175 These critics may have evidence on their side because the NCAA is riddled
with scandals of players already being paid under the table. In addition,
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interview with the Public Broadcasting Service, Mark Emmert,
current president of the NCAA, addressed these concerns and
suggested that the NCAA’s most important priority was to
prevent the commercialization of college athletics.176 Even though
Mr. Emmert recognizes the challenge of preserving the
amateur status of student-athletes in the modern era of
commercialized college athletics, his promotion of the reform of
the one-year scholarship rule undermines the very principle of
amateurism by identifying a student-athlete labor market and
by introducing employee-like contracts.
1. Identifying a Student-Athlete Labor Market
Prior to Agnew v. NCAA, courts opined, “[T]he market
for scholarship athletes cannot be considered a labor market,
since schools do not engage in price competition for players, nor
does supply and demand determine the worth of student-
athletes’ labor.”177 By contrast, the Agnew court suggested that
there is obviously a market at play, and explained that the only
reason schools do not “engage in price competition for student-
athletes is that other NCAA bylaws prevent them” from doing
so.178 With the enactment of the option to offer multiyear
scholarships, NCAA bylaws no longer prohibit, and in fact
encourage, price competition for student-athletes, demonstrating
[i]n 2010, despite the faltering economy, a single college athletic league, the
football-crazed Southeastern Conference (SEC), became the first to crack the
billion-dollar barrier in athletic receipts. The Big Ten pursued closely at $905
million. That money comes from a combination of ticket sales, concession
sales, merchandise, licensing fees, and other sources—but the great bulk of it
comes from television contracts.
Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2011, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643;
see also Nocero, supra note 79 (“College football and men’s basketball have become such
huge commercial enterprises that together they generate more than $6 billion in
annual revenue, more than the National Basketball Association.”).
176 Mark Emmert stated,
I think the biggest challenge that faces intercollegiate athletics right now is,
in fact, trying to protect the notion of intercollegiate athletics as a place
where student-athletes compete . . . So when we talk about the creeping
commercialization of it, what we’re concerned about—what I’m concerned
about—is making sure that we maintain that preprofessional amateur status
of the student-athletes while recognizing that there’s increasingly greater
interest in the whole nature of athletics in America.
Mark Emmert Interview, supra note 10.
177 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 346 (referencing Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091
(7th Cir. 1992)).
178 Id.
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that the value of the scholarship is based upon the supply of and
demand for players.
The NCAA’s new scholarship rule provides universities
with a template to formally engage in classical price competition
over student-athletes. Prior to October 2011, student-athletes
could “neither be awarded [an athletic scholarship] for a period in
excess of one academic year nor for a period less than one
academic year.”179 To comply with this bylaw, member
institutions could only offer identical one-year renewable
scholarships to high school athletes. Alternatively, the new rule
provides member institutions the discretion to offer one-year
renewable scholarships or up to a five-year guaranteed
scholarships.180 Colleges have taken,181 and will continue to take
advantage of this rule by offering athletic-scholarships of
various lengths, inevitably using multiyear scholarships as a
recruiting tactic to persuade highly sought-after student-
athletes to attend their school over another. An athletic
scholarship awarded for up to four or five years guarantees a
gifted athlete funding for a full education and provides “a
significant incentive to select a university offering a four-year aid
package over other schools offering only one-year scholarships
with merely the possibility for renewal.”182 According to CNN in
2011, “[t]he sticker price of living and studying for a year at a
typical private college rose 4.3% to $42,224.”183 Each year this cost
rises as tuition at public, community, and private colleges across
the country escalates,184 forcing many students to take out loans
to pay for their education and pushing our nation closer to the
brink of a student debt crisis.185 College recruiters will certainly
take advantage of this frightening reality, by emphasizing the
particular monetary value on the offer they are extending to
prospective recruits, which now can vary significantly.
As a representative from Indiana State University
astutely indicated in opposition to the new scholarship policy,
“to get into bidding wars where one school offers a 75 percent
179 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 14, at 200.
180 See supra note 86.
181 Multiyear Scholarship Plan Moves on, supra note 21.
182 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the
Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 112 (2006).
183 Kim Clark, College Costs Climb, Yet Again, CNN MONEY (Oct. 29, 2011,
6:09 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/26/pf/college/college_tuition_cost/index.htm.
184 Id.
185 See Megan McArdle, Is College a Lousy Investment, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 29,
2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/09/09/megan-mcardle-on-the-coming-
burst-of-the-college-bubble.html.
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(scholarship) for two years and the other school then offers 85
percent for three years, etc.,”186 creates unfair advantages in
the recruiting process. To understand the “bidding wars” or
price competition that will occur as recruiters vie for prospective
student-athletes one need only conduct simple arithmetic. Using
the estimates from 2011,187 a school that offers a one-year
renewable scholarship would only be guaranteeing a player
approximately $42,224 toward his or her education.188 On the
other hand, another university might offer a five-year
scholarship, which includes an added $2,000 expense award per
year, promising over $220,000 guaranteed toward that athlete’s
education.189 Thus, the NCAA transformed athletic scholarships
into a bargaining chip that demonstrates concretely that
universities engage in price competition over student-athletes,
and that provides further evidence of the ways in which
recruiters already engage in such competition.190
In addition, the new rule recognizes a labor market for
student-athletes by highlighting the reality that “the value of
the scholarship is based upon . . . the supply and demand for
players.”191 The NCAA’s regulation on the amount of
186 Complaint at 14, Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (No.
12-CV-1019).
187 See Clark, supra note 183.
188 See Grasgreen, supra note 90.
189 Grasgreen stated,
Athletes can receive additional scholarship funds of up to $2,000 or the full
cost of attendance, whichever is less. Depending on the institution, the gap
ranges from $200 to nearly $11,000 per year, and is the result of
miscellaneous costs incurred on top of the tuition and fees, room and board,
and books that full athletic scholarships currently cover. The $2,000 limit will
be in place for at least three years, the board said, but in the future will be
adjusted according to the consumer price index.
Id.
190 In Agnew, the court stated that
[C]olleges do, in fact, compete for student athletes, though the price they pay
involves in-kind benefits as opposed to cash. For instance, colleges may compete
to hire the coach that will be best able to launch players from the NCAA to the
National Football League, an attractive component for a prospective college
football player. Colleges also engage in veritable arms races to provide top-of-the-
line training facilities which, in turn, are supposed to attract collegiate athletes.
Many future student-athletes also look to the strength of a college’s academic
programs in deciding where to attend. These are all part of the competitive
market to attract student-athletes whose athletic labor can result in many
benefits for a college, including economic gain.
Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012). Moreover, universities have
resorted to illegal forms of price competition, like offering cash or other incentives,
which results in countless scandals.
191 Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992).
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scholarships has varied over the years. Currently, the NCAA
limits the amount of scholarships universities can offer in every
sport.192 While the NCAA maintained the one-year scholarship
rule, the demand for student-athletes at a given university
remained restricted to the limited number of scholarships and
the fixed value of one-year scholarships. Therefore, plaintiff
student-athletes struggled to “allege that NCAA colleges purchase
labor through the grant-in-aid athletic scholarships offered to
college players when the value of the scholarship is based upon
the school’s tuition and room and board.”193 Because schools can
now award athletic scholarships of varying amounts, the value of
a scholarship is no longer related to the expense of attending a
university, but to the perceived athletic value of a student-athlete
to that school.194 Furthermore, because teams that win are more
profitable, if the new scholarship rule remains in place, schools
will learn the best combination of differently valued athletes to
create more successful teams. This will affect a school’s demand
for a particular one-year or two-year or five-year guaranteed
scholarship caliber athlete, and consequently an individual
student-athlete’s contribution to a program will be valued
accordingly and reflected in his scholarship.
The value of scholarships awarded each year will also
depend on the supply of quality student-athletes graduating
high school each year. Organizations like Max Preps, Rivals,
ESPN, and others dedicate portions of their websites to
recording statistics of high school athletes and to ranking
them.195 These rankings assess the top overall recruits in the
country and the best players by position, track a player’s
scholarship offers and commitment, and grade universities on
their eventual recruiting class.196 These analysts travel the
country attending camps or combines—held by universities,
independent organizations, and corporations such as Nike—
where student-athletes preform drills and play games to put
their talents on display.197 For these students, the goal is to
192 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 14, at 202-15.
193 Banks, 977 F.2d at 1091.
194 The greater the athletic ability of a prospect the more scholarship money that
prospect will likely be awarded.
195 See, e.g., Recruiting Nation Football, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/football/recruiting/index (last visited Oct. 1, 2013); MAXPREPS,
http://www.maxpreps.com/national/national.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013); RIVALS,
http://www.rivals.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
196 Id.
197 See 2014 Nike Football SPARQ Combines, STUDENT SPORTS,
http://www.studentsports.com/nike-football-sparq-combine-registration/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2014).
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make a “top-list” or to receive a five-star ranking, because this
translates to multiple scholarship offers. Now that the NCAA
member institutions can offer varying scholarships, the supply
of “five-star” caliber student-athletes will affect the amount of
multiyear scholarships offered each year.
Moreover, the new rule will likely increase the supply of
student-athletes in the overall market. Each year a number of
high-school student-athletes choose to go to schools that do not
provide athletic scholarships.198 Often this is because these
institutions are some of best academic institutions in the country,
such as those in the Ivy League.199 But some recruits choose to
forgo an athletic scholarship because they fear being unable to
compete athletically or sustaining an injury.200 At a Division I
school, this meant their scholarship might not be renewed. Now
with the possibility of receiving an athletic scholarship that
guarantees the full cost of an athlete’s education, these
individuals might be persuaded to reenter the market.201
2. Engaging in Contract Negotiations
Due to the athletic scholarship, “[c]ourts and scholars
already overwhelmingly recognize the contractual nature of the
relationship between student-athletes and their institutions.”202
198 Bill Pennington, Financial Aid Changes Game as Ivy Sports Teams
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/12/23/sports/financial-aid-changes-game-as-sports-teams-in-ivies-
rise.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
“We’re seeing a significant change in the caliber of the student-athlete,” said
Steve Bilsky, the University of Pennsylvania’s athletic director, one of more
than 50 Ivy League administrators and coaches interviewed. “It’s not even
the same population because the pool has widened. We see a considerable
number of student-athletes turning down athletic scholarships from places
like Stanford, Northwestern or Duke to come to Penn.”
199 Recruits like Christian Webster, who chose to go to Harvard University instead
of taking one of his twenty-five athletic-scholarship offers to play basketball. Id.
200 Instead, these students choose to pay to attend schools that they would
consider better academic institutions. As Christian Webster explained, “It’s a sacrifice
but it’s doable. . . . It’s not free, but it’s also not the full price of $50,000 or more. To me
it was a 40-year life decision, not a four-year decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (explaining his decision to attend Harvard University for $20,000 a year,
instead of attending a university that offered him a one-year renewable scholarship).
201 “[S]tudent-athletes contemplating scholarship offers likely include
economic factors in their decision-making process, such as the value of a given degree
or the increased potential for entry into professional football.” Agnew v. NCAA, 683
F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012).
202 Hakim, supra note 59, at 169.
The Letter of Intent, Statement of Financial Aid, and university bulletins and
brochures provide the basis for the contractual relationship between the
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Despite the incessant call from critics and reformers that the
NCAA should acknowledge the employer-employee relationship
between universities and pay their athletes—thereby ridding
the NCAA of the student-athlete myth203—the NCAA
adamantly rejects the notion that an employment relationship
exists and refuses to create one. President Mark Emmert
stated he “can’t say often enough, obviously, that student-
athletes are students; they are not employees . . . [and it] would
be utterly unacceptable . . . to convert students into
employees . . . . We don’t pay our student-athletes.”204 The NCAA’s
position stems from the history of the athletic scholarship and its
creation of a legal argument that a scholarship cannot be
considered payment—and that student-athletes cannot be
considered employees—so long as the scholarship does not exceed
the cost of tuition and miscellaneous expenses.205 Although “the
NCAA has crafted a body of case law that provides a position that
student-athletes will remain simply student-athletes and will not
obtain employee status,”206 in light of one of the most “tumultuous
years in college sports”207 the NCAA’s position is vulnerable.
university and a student-athlete. The offer extended by the institution is
found in its promise to pay for the legitimate educational expenses incurred
by the student-athlete, while attending the university. The acceptance is
found in the student-athlete’s return promise to provide athletic participation
for the university and abide by the rules of the NCAA, conference, and
institution for the duration of the scholarship period. A student-athlete
accepts the initial offer presented by the university by signing the Letter of
Intent, which formalizes the bargaining process and outlines each parties’ intent
to be bound to the terms and conditions contained within. The student-athlete
will also sign a statement of financial aid offered by the university formalizing the
conditions and amount of the financial scholarship award. Valuable consideration
is found in the monetary value of the athletic scholarship and the student-
athlete’s promise only to attend a particular institution.
Id. at 169-70.
203 See generally McCormick & McCormick, supra note 182; see also Stephen
L. Ukeiley, No Salary No Union, No Collective Bargaining: Scholarship Athletes Are an
Employer’s Dream Come True 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 167, 177-78 (1996); Nocero,
supra note 79; Branch, supra note 175. Among these critics are college athletes
themselves, who formed the labor organization College Athletes Players Association
(“CAPA”), and the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board, Region 13,
Peter Sung Ohr, who ruled in favor of CAPA holding that scholarship football players
at Northwestern University are employees under the National Labor Relations Act and
may conduct an election to unionize. See generally Northwestern Univ. v. College
Athletes Player Ass’n, N.L.R.B No. 13-RC-121359 (Mar. 26, 2014).
204 Mark Emmert Interview, supra note 10.
205 See supra Part I.
206 Dennie, supra note 12, at 46.
207 “[W]hich included conference realignment motivated by greed, several
lawsuits that challenged the NCAA on antitrust grounds, and a massive scandal at
Penn State that raised questions about the role of big-time college sports in university
governance.” Sack, supra note 22.
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The adoption of a scholarship rule that creates dramatically
different scholarship offers and negotiations between student-
athletes and member institutions is incongruous with the NCAA’s
unwavering stance that no employee-like relationship exists. With
the reintroduction of the multiyear athletic scholarship, students
can shop themselves to different universities to discover the price
of their abilities indicated by the amount of guaranteed years
offered in their scholarships—the potential contract salary for
their labor.208 Even though players with lesser skill may still
have their one-year scholarships renewed and eventually receive
the same amount as the player guaranteed a five-year scholarship
upfront, this process exacerbates the emphasis placed on athletic
ability and performance, and eliminates any consideration of
helping to subsidize a player’s education. This resembles the
problem the NCAA faced when it first instituted athletic
scholarships, and courts used the athletic scholarship as an
indicator that the players qualified for worker’s compensation
benefits.209 Consequently, athletic scholarships can now, more
than ever, be paralleled to employment contracts, eroding the
notion of amateurism before athletes even step foot on campus and
enter the commercialized world of big-time college athletics.
The new scholarship policy contradicts the notion of
amateurism not only because scholarship offers now resemble
employment contracts, but also because it places academic
goals at odds with athletic goals during the recruiting process.
That student-athletes receive a valuable education is critical to
the notion of amateurism. At the earliest stages of its
organization, the NCAA posited an idealized notion of amateurism
in college athletics, where an athlete focused primarily on
something other than sports.210 The role of academics endures
today as President Emmert denied the claim that student-athletes
are employees on the basis that the NCAA “provide[s] [student-
athletes] with remarkable opportunities to get an education at
the finest universities on earth—that’s American universities
and colleges.”211 But almost since its inception, the NCAA has
struggled to maintain the illusion that student-athletes are
208 A representative from St. Francis College stated that as a result of the new
scholarship policy, “prospective student athletes shop themselves around for the best
deal in terms of length and compensation.” Complaint at 14-15, Rock v. NCAA, No. 12-
CV-1019 (S.D. Ind. 2012).
209 See, e.g., Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963);
Fort Lewis A&M State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957);
Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1954).
210 See SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 33.
211 Mark Emmert Interview, supra note 10.
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primarily students.212 In the commercialized NCAA that exists
today, it is apparent that athletes in big-time sports play a
limited role as students, exemplified by the amount of hours
dedicated to their sport, the limitation on academic choices, the
reduced standards to which they are subjected, the weak
curricula they assume, and the low graduation rates they
achieve.213 As many people believe, student-athletes are “just
brought in to play some games. They don’t get a very good
education, if they get one at all.”214
Amid all this criticism, the NCAA’s new scholarship policy
pits athletics against academics by asking high school students to
choose guaranteed education over athletic glory. Schools will try
to entice athletes with four or five-year scholarships that
practically provide a guaranteed paid education. But these
schools face opposition from more successful programs that play
up the appeal of winning, becoming a professional, playing in
bowl games, and learning from premiere coaches in premiere
facilities (all football-related benefits). Although less than two
percent of collegiate athletes make it to professional sports,215 this
is obviously a huge attraction for many high school students,
whose dream since childhood has been to become a professional
athlete in their chosen sport.216 The situation will certainly arise
in which a student chooses a one-year renewal offer from a school
whose football team is consistently ranked in the top 25, instead
of a school whose team is less successful, but guarantees four fully
funded years of education. This places the decision on teenagers
to choose between the guarantee of an academic degree and
potential athletic fame.217
212 SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 29, at 33.
213 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 182, at 120; see also Branch, supra
note 175; Nocera, supra note 79.
214 Ukeiley, supra note 203, at 209.
215 Except for baseball where 11.6% of collegiate baseball players play
professionally. Tom Manfred, Here are the Odds Your Kid Becomes a Professional
Athlete, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2012, 4:21 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/odds-
college-athletes-become-professionals-2012-2?op=1.
216 See id.
217 Although it may appear that the new scholarship policy provides students
with a valuable bargaining chip, it fails to sufficiently protect those it will most likely
affect, namely young black men who have been exploited by the recruiting process since
the 1970s. As Gerald D. Higginbotham explains,
Young black children develop deep aspirations for sports because images of
successful black figures in the media are usually limited to popular black
entertainers and sportsmen and in the black communities athletic achievement
is rewarded more than any other activity. Sport, being focused more on physical
and athletic ability rather than academic knowledge or social has lead to social
mobility for immigrants and minority groups who faced discrimination other
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B. Maintenance of Competitive Balance
The Supreme Court recognized maintenance of a
competitive balance as a legitimate procompetitive justification for
an NCAA bylaw under the rule of reason.218 The court assessed
that in some instances regulations that fostered “equal competition
will maximize consumer demand for the product.”219 When the
NCAA adopted the one-year renewable scholarship in 1973, it
supported the policy by claiming it would create competitive
balance.220 The NCAA proposed that a uniform scholarship rule
would even competition between universities offering only one-year
scholarships and universities offering extended-term scholarships,
thus preventing the recruiting process from disadvantaging any
one university.221 The NCAA reaffirmed its stance in Agnew v.
NCAA arguing “that multi-year scholarships would make it too
difficult for less wealthy schools to compete in the recruiting
market.”222 The NCAA, however, abandoned this position when it
revised its bylaws to allow universities the discretion to offer single
or multiyear scholarships.
The removal of the one-year scholarship rule marks a
complete abandonment of the NCAA’s longstanding position
that the rule was necessary to maintain a competitive
balance.223 By no longer regulating the length of a
scholarship offer, the NCAA explicitly states that a single
and mandatory type of scholarship is not necessary to ensure
that all universities have an equal opportunity to have
successful programs. Unsurprisingly, member institutions met
this policy change with resistance. These institutions argued
that for decades they had operated under the belief, as the NCAA
had purported, that a universal limit on scholarships prevented
prospects from being wooed from their university by a school
offering a more beneficial financial package. In opposition to the
sectors of the economy. Universities have capitalized on the fact that African-
Americans view professional sports as one of their most achievable goals and
quickest path to stardom. Institutions recruit these players to profit from their
athletic abilities as the players mainly focus on becoming professional athletes.
Gerald D. Higginbotham, Free Play: Unmasking and Ending the Exploitation of NCAA
Student-Athletes, STUDENT PULSE, available at http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/
552/2/free-play-unmasking-and-ending-the-exploitation-of-ncaa-student-athletes
(internal quotations omitted) (last updated May 6, 2014).
218 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
219 The product of college sports. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119-20.
220 Hakim, supra note 59, at 158.
221 See id.
222 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 344 (7th Cir. 2012).
223 See Hakim, supra note 59, at 158.
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new rule, some member institutions argue that more financially
capable programs, whether through success or devotion of
resources, are afforded an unfair advantage in the recruiting
process because they will have the ability to offer more multiyear
scholarships.224 As a result, they will be able to attract the most
gifted athletes and create dominant teams, which will ultimately
decrease the product of collegiate sports, because fans want to see
exciting games and not one-sided games.
The Agnew court and critics expressed skepticism that
the ban on multiyear scholarships will affect the overall product
of collegiate football because the sport flourished prior to the
institution of the ban.225 But this argument appears to be tenuous
given the dramatic evolution of college football, specifically in the
recruiting processes, over the last four decades. Absent any
empirical evidence, it is difficult to quantify the effect the new
rule will have on universities’ abilities to compete in the
recruiting process.226 Yet, it is not farfetched to imagine that
schools that devote more financial resources to their athletic
programs may receive an advantage from having more multiyear
scholarships at their disposal.
Additionally, the divergence from the justification of the
one-year scholarship as a necessity for the maintenance of a
competitive balance uncovers the ulterior motive behind the long-
contested policy. Member institutions expressed outrage over the
NCAA’s shift in scholarship policy because it hinders their ability
to decline to renew a student-athlete’s scholarship. Over 62% of
the member institutions voted to override the legislation.227 A
representative of one institution stated that the new policy:
Creates a recruiting disaster . . . institutions will be competing for
recruits by making the best deal . . . in order to be competitive,
institutions may offer multiyear awards so they can sign higher level
recruits. However, there is never a guarantee that the incoming
student-athlete will be a good fit for the program and the institution.
If it is a poor fit the program is put in a difficult situation to continue
to keep a student-athlete on scholarship.228
Member institutions that oppose the rule believe that the
burdens associated with preserving a scholarship for a player who
lacks “athletic usefulness” inhibits their ability to produce a
224 See Levin, supra note 24.
225 See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 344.
226 Id.
227 See Hosick, supra note 86.
228 Complaint at 13, Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (No.
12-CV-1019).
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competitive team.229 According to these member institutions, the
new policy not only eliminates a necessary regulation to maintain
a competitive balance, but also enacts a new policy that actually
undermines their ability to compete.
IV. UNSOUND POLICY: FAILURE TO SUPPORTNCAA
PRINCIPLES
The option to allow universities to offer student-athletes
multiyear scholarships not only marks a retreat from the NCAA’s
classical legal defenses, but it also fails to provide the reform
needed to protect student-athletes and eliminate the harm that
gives rise to antitrust clams.
Although it was important for the NCAA to reform its
scholarship policy, its adopted policy suffers from a number of
critical shortcomings. First, the new rule fails to address the
problem created by one-year renewable scholarship offers,
which caused the injury to the plaintiffs who brought forth the
antitrust litigation.230 Universities are not required to offer
multiyear scholarships, but rather have the option to do so.231 As a
result, many student-athletes will continue to fear that their
scholarship will not be renewed, and thus sacrifice their
academics and risk playing with injury.232 Even an NCAA
Presidential Taskforce concluded that, under the one-year
scholarship policy: “[A]thletes may be legitimately concerned that
their continued access to education depends on sports success.
This can create a conflict of incentives that may lead to an
emphasis on athletics at the cost of academics.”233 Moreover, the
continued “fear of losing a scholarship and the economic hardship
associated with expensive tuition incentivize injured student-
athletes to resume playing before full recovery.”234 It is possible
that the new scholarship policy might in fact magnify these
problems for many student-athletes because coaches might not
renew a one-year scholarship to make room for a multiyear
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., Agnew, 683 F.3d at 332-33; see also Complaint at 19-25, Rock, 928
F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (No. 12-CV-1019).
231 Levin, supra note 24.
232 See Branch, supra note 175 (At “‘informal’ football workouts at the University
of Iowa just after the season-ending bowl games—workouts so grueling that 41 of the 56
amateur student-athletes collapsed, and 13 were hospitalized with rhabdomyolysis, a life-
threatening kidney condition often caused by excessive exercise.”).
233 Brian C. Root, How The Promises of Riches in Collegiate Athletics Lead to
the Compromised Long-Term Health of Student-Athletes: Why and How the NCAA
Should Protect Its Student-Athletes’ Health, 19 HEALTHMATRIX 279, 288 (2009).
234 Id.
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scholarship recruit.235 By ignoring the harm experienced by
student-athletes, the NCAA fails to discourage student-athletes
from bringing suits for compensatory damages.
Second, without representation from agents, student-
athletes are ill-prepared to engage in the bargaining process for
contracts that fully protect them.236 The NCAA recently
removed the restrictions that limited college coaches’ ability to
contact recruits, further aiding their already zealous recruiting
behavior. Now, as early as the end of a prospect’s sophomore year
“there will be no restrictions on phone calls, text messaging or
contacting recruits via social media messengers.”237 Although this
form of official contact is limited to the end of sophomore year,
that does not prevent coaches from recruiting as early as middle
school. This summer at their football camp, Louisiana State
University’s football coaches offered a “soon-to-be eighth grader” a
scholarship to be a member of the class of 2017.238 Student-
athletes rely on these offers and the promises made by recruiters,
but lack any means to guarantee that they will be fulfilled.
Coaches are free to renege on their offers, “regardless of [whether
a recruit] verbally committed or signed their National Letter of
Intent.”239 This typically occurs as a result of oversigning, where
“[s]chools often sign more players than they have available
roster spots under the assumption that not all of the signees
will qualify for the financial aid award.”240 When more recruits
sign than there are spots available, “lesser regarded signees
are told there is no room for them.”241 The addition of gradations in
scholarship guarantees provides coaches with an additional
incentive to entice and exploit student-athletes in an already
235 “From 2008 to 2009, 22 percent of men’s college basketball players didn’t
have their scholarships renewed, according to the National College Players
Association.” Jamilah King, How Scholarships Leave Student-Athletes Powerless in the
NCAA Game, COLORLINES (Mar. 23, 2012, 10:08 AM), http://colorlines.com/
archives/2012/03/ncaa_scholarships_rules.html.
236 Miller, supra note 7, at 1155.
237 Josh Barr, NCAA Changing Basketball Recruiting Model, WASH. POST
(Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/recruiting-insider/post/ncaa-
changing-basketball-recruiting-model-will-allow-coaches-unlimited-calls-and-texts-to-
juniors-and-seniors/2011/10/27/gIQA5ci8MM_blog.html.
238 “Indeed, even if he accepted the offer, Dylan Moses couldn’t officially sign
with LSU for another five years.” David Helman, LSU Courts Middle Schooler, ESPN
(July, 26, 2012, 10:03 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8199497/soon-
8th-grader-dylan-moses-offered-lsu-tigers-scholarship.
239 Justin N. Fielkow, “Notional” Letter of Intent: College Football Offers More
Than It Can Deliver, TULANE SPORTS BLOG, http://www.law.tulane.edu/
tlsAcademicPrograms/sportsblog.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
240 Id.
241 Id.
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inequitable system. Without the assistance of counsel or an agent
to help negotiate for a beneficial scholarship, the change to allow
multiyear scholarship offers fails to “truly protect[] the student-
athlete’s academic or athletic pursuits.”242
Instead, the new rule benefits the NCAA by insulating
the organization from further litigation and perpetuating its
history of self-protective measures under the guise of reforms
to protect student-athletes. The option to award multiyear
scholarships only revises a bylaw that the NCAA feared courts
might have found violated antitrust law. The new rule effectively
removes the unreasonable restriction by allowing member
institutions the freedom to award any scholarship that they
choose. As a result, future plaintiffs will not be able to prove
injury, as was claimed in the Agnew and Rock complaints,
because the student-athletes cannot allege that they would have
been awarded a multiyear scholarship but for the bylaw. This
eliminates a cause of action for student-athletes to challenge a
university’s unfair failure to renew a scholarship, and
demonstrates that “scholarship is still an area where the
NCAA . . . fail[s] in its mission to protect student-athletes.”243
Ultimately, the NCAA’s “Prevent Defense” from this
particular antitrust challenge is shortsighted because it willfully
adopts policy that erodes its legal defenses and fails to rectify
harm caused to the student-athletes it vows to protect. Such
policy decisions uncover a long history of building and protecting
a commercialized big business. The reaction of member
institutions to the new policy substantiates the critique that the
NCAA’s scholarship policy for the last four decades attempted to
reduce costs, rather than maintain competition between
universities. Since the inception of the multiyear scholarship ban,
coaches and universities denied cancelling scholarships due to
poor athletic performance or injury. But, as one critic questioned,
“[i]f they were telling the truth, why did so many oppose this
[multiyear scholarship option]?”244 The opposition by member
institutions reveals that the primary purpose of the scholarship
policy was to reduce costs associated with scholarships and enable
coaches to “run-off” players they no longer wanted.245 These cost-
cutting benefits came at the expense and exploitation of student-
242 Miller, supra note 7, at 1156.
243 Id.
244 Sack, supra note 22.
245 See Hakim, supra note 59, at 167.
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athletes.246 The one-year scholarship fueled the practices that
enable modern-day coaches to control every aspect of a student-
athlete’s life from the time he arrives on campus to his graduation
(if a player is among the minority to reach graduation).247 As
result, student-athletes devote over 50 hours a week to their sport
in season and offseason, play through injuries, miss class or give
up certain majors, without a promise of continued education,
leading to terribly low graduation rates for athletes who play
revenue-generating sports.248
The exposure of a significant regulatory area where the
NCAA not only failed to protect student-athletes, but also
facilitated their exploitation, uncovers the hypocrisy of the NCAA’s
bylaws. This creates increased vulnerabilities for other bylaws,
including those that have existed for long periods of time.249 For
example, in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litigation, an ongoing antitrust case, a class made up of
current and former NCAA student-athletes is challenging the
NCAA restriction on allowing athletes to profit from the use of
their names and likenesses.250 In an attempt to have the case
dismissed, the NCAA argued the claims present “nothing more
246 “Cost-cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification.” Yasser,
supra note 28, at 1013 n.188.
247 This is because student-athletes fear that they will lose their scholarship,
and that “their continued access to education depends on sports success.” Id.
248 See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 182; see also Luke DeCock, Football
Graduation Gap Remains a Chasm, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 24, 2012, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/09/24/2367364/decock-football-graduation-gap.html
(“Three years after the University of North Carolina’s College Sport Research Institute
started tracking graduation rates based not on raw numbers but on how athletes
performed when compared to other students, nothing has changed. Football players are
still graduating about 20 percent less than regular students. The latest edition of the
study, planned for release Tuesday, found that FBS football players were 17 percent less
likely to graduate than their male peers, down from 20 percent last year, with a three-
year rolling average of 19 percent [graduation gap].”).
249 This vulnerability even extends to the viability of the scholarship itself. In
two different district courts, California and New Jersey, classes of student-athlete
plaintiffs have recently filed claims alleging that the athletic scholarship artificially
caps collegiate athletes’ compensation to the cost of tuition, room, board, and books,
and thus violate the Sherman Act. See Complaint, Alston v. NCAA, No. 3:14-cv-01011
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2014); see also Complaint, Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 3:33-av-00001
(D.N.J Mar. 17, 2014).
250 See Steve Berkowitz, Judge Denies NCAA’s Motion to Dismiss Antitrust
Lawsuit, USA TODAY SPORTS (Oct. 25, 2013, 6:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/college/2013/10/25/ncaa-antritrust-lawsuit-electronic-arts-ed-obannon-
names-likenesses/3188993/; see alsoMarc Edelman, Federal Court Ruling PavesWay for Class
Action Antitrust Challenge to NCAA Amateurism Rules, FORBES, (Oct. 28, 2013, 8:13 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/10/28/federal-court-ruling-paves-the-way-for-
class-action-challenge-to-ncaa-amateurism-rules/; Tom Farrey,NCAAMotion Denied in Player
Suit, ESPN (Nov. 5, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9879455/judge-
denies-motion-dismiss-ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit.
1370 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:3
than a challenge to the NCAA’s rules on amateurism,” which the
NCAA posited were protected under Board of Regents.251 The court
rejected this argument stating that Board of Regents does not bar
the student-athletes antitrust claims and that the NCAA must
demonstrate that the ban “serves some procompetitive purpose.”252
The District Court for the Northern District of California made
clear that to defeat the antitrust claims the NCAA would need to
rely on its traditional procompetitive justifications of amateurism
and maintenance of competitive balance. Because the court utilized
Agnew and Rock to deny the NCAA’s motion to dismiss,253 the
plaintiff class can use these cases to demonstrate that the NCAA
has recently weakened its traditional legal defenses, and therefore
those defenses are no longer sufficient to justify the restraint on the
market at issue in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litigation. Although the NCAA and its “member schools
have downplayed the antitrust risks that stem from their current
mode of business[,]”254 it appears courts no longer accept that the
“NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve
[the] character”255 of collegiate athletics, but rather treat the NCAA
like a comparable profit-maximizing business.
CONCLUSION: ADOPTION OF THEMANDATORYMULTIYEARDEAL
The NCAA’s decision to revive the multiyear scholarship by
allowing member institutions the option to provide scholarships for
more than one year is an unsound policy because it undermines the
NCAA’s traditional legal defenses to antitrust litigation and fails to
protect student-athletes. In reality, the NCAA could rectify the
problems of its newly adopted scholarship policy simply by
251 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. C-
09-1967-CW, 2013 WL 5778233, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
252 Id. at *6.
253 “In recent years, courts have held that NCAA rules restricting the size and
availability of student-athletes’ scholarships and financial aid grants may be challenged
under the Sherman Act, even though they relate to forms of student-athlete compensation.”
Id. at *12 (citing Rock v. NCAA, 2013 WL 4479815, at *14 (S.D. Ind. 2013)). The court
continued to refute the NCAA’s argument by stating,
Although the plaintiffs in Agnew focused on the NCAA’s scholarship rules,
rather than its rules prohibiting student-athletes from licensing their
publicity rights, the court’s rationale for distinguishing Board of Regents is
still persuasive here: in short, Board of Regents did not address the impact of
the NCAA’s horizontal restraints on student-athletes.
Id. at *6.
254 Edelman, supra note 250.
255 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, at 101-02 (1984).
2014] PREVENT DEFENSE 1371
eliminating one-year renewable scholarships entirely and only
allowing member institutions to offer multiyear scholarships.
By instituting a mandatory multiyear scholarship that
provides the guaranteed cost of attendance for all student-
athletes to graduate,256 the NCAA can revive its legal defenses
and protect student-athletes. As Louis Hakim points out, “The
formation of the extended-term scholarship contract will
essentially follow the requisites of the scholarship agreement
under the current system. The critical difference is that the
parties will promise to be bound for four or five years rather than
simply one year.”257
First, the mandatory multiyear policy would prevent
coaches from cancelling scholarships of players who they no
longer want or who suffered injuries,258 thereby eliminating the
harm experienced by the plaintiffs in Agnew and Rock. To
appease coaches and universities, players who quit without
cause would become eligible to lose their scholarship because a
student-athlete would have to remain eligible and willing to
participate in athletics to maintain his or her athletic
scholarship.259 Second, a mandatory four-year scholarship
reinforces NCAA’s ideal of amateurism—“[s]tudent-[a]thletes
shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by
the physical, mental[,] and social benefits to be derived”260—by
shifting the emphasis to ensuring an education.261 Third, a rule
that regulates evenly and limits universities to a singular type of
scholarship option reinstates a competitive balance.
Critics of such a policy argue that this will decrease the
quality of play on the field because coaches will be forced to
carry players who they feel do not have the ability to make an
impact. Among these critics are many college coaches
256 This would most likely range from three to six years depending on whether
a student-athlete graduated early or elected to use a redshirt and medical redshirt.
257 Hakim, supra note 59, at 170.
258 Id. at 167.
259 Id. at 165. The NCAA would need to create a provision or assign a committee to
review these terminations to ensure that coaches were not running off undesirable players.
260 Kristen R. Muenzen, Comment, Weakening Its Own Defense? The NCAA’s
Version of Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 257, 283-84 (2003).
261 The mandatory scholarship rule must be an initial step to shift the
paradigm in college athletics to emphasize the student-athlete’s education. Such a shift
would require critical subsequent measures, including scaling back the number of
allowable hours devoted to sport, eliminating the reduced academic standards for
college athletes, and increasing the available academic support, in order to eradicate
the low graduation rates and provide the meaningful education promised. See supra
notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
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themselves, who prefer one-year scholarships because it
provides them overwhelming discretion over their teams and
ultimately the fates of their student-athletes. These coaches also
fear that guaranteed scholarships increase the costs associated
with scholarships.262 But,
[t]he average compensation for head football coaches at public
universities, now more than $2 million, has grown 750 percent
(adjusted for inflation) since the Regents decision in 1984; that’s
more than 20 times the cumulative 32 percent raise for college
professors. For top basketball coaches, annual contracts now exceed
$4 million, augmented by assorted bonuses, endorsements, country-
club memberships, the occasional private plane, and in some cases a
negotiated percentage of ticket receipts.263
Coaches should not bemoan developing the players they
recruited considering that is the job for which they receive such
significant salaries. Moreover, if mandatory multiyear
scholarships, which ensure that student-athletes graduate, do in
fact increase costs for athletic programs, it justly reallocates the
revenue to the individuals who generate it. Finally, any reduction
of quality of play at the cost of “enhancing academic integrity and
educational primacy in intercollegiate athletics”264 should be
welcomed from organizations whose claimed principles are
“educational values and academic integrity,” such as the NCAA
and its member institutions.265
Vincent J. DiForte†
262 Branch, supra note 175.
263 Id.
264 Hakim, supra note 59, at 168-69.
265 Id. at 164-65.
† J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2014; B.A. Amherst College, 2010.
Thank you to the editors and staff of Brooklyn Law Review for their insights and guidance. I
would also like to thank my family and Amanda Barrow for their love and support.
